The Border’s Troubled Waters

It has been said the wars of the future will be waged for the control of water. On the Texas-Mexico border, certainly, tension over the distribution of shared water resources is rising. Complicating the facts that the region is both arid and experiencing rapid population growth is the binational dimension of the situation. While open conflict between the two countries is, fortunately, highly unlikely, soothing the border’s troubled waters will be no easy task. In a two-part series beginning this month, borderlines examines U.S.-Mexico relations regarding border waters.

by Mary Kelly and Arturo Solís with George Kourous

For Mexico, assuring an adequate water supply has emerged as a critical issue for the coming decades. Figures from Mexico’s National Water Commission (CNA) indicate that the nation’s current water supply is less than half of what it was in the 1950s. According to Victor Lichtinger, who heads Mexico’s Secretariat of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), more than 12 million Mexicans do not have access to drinking water, and a number of large urban centers are currently facing serious water supply problems. Mexico averages only 5,000 cubic meters of water per person—an amount far below the global average of 8,000 to 10,000 cubic meters. In contrast, the United States, Canada, Europe, and some South American countries enjoy as much as 30,000 cubic meters of water per capita. To make matters worse, some 52% of Mexican territory is classified as arid or semiarid. Many of these regions are in danger of desertification as a result of ongoing deforestation, overgrazing, and overexploitation of groundwater supplies.

In the dry border region, the situation is especially dire. Booming U.S.-Mexico trade under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has accelerated the growth of border manufacturing centers and sparked a rise in export-oriented agriculture in certain dry northern states like Sonora. As a result, the region’s rivers are being more heavily tapped then ever before and the area’s aquifers are being mined at dangerously high rates.

For instance, in the Ciudad Juárez-El Paso area, many have predicted that groundwater supplies may essentially run dry in 20 years. While El Paso has begun to develop water rights in rural counties to the east, it has also increased its dependence on surface waters taken from the Río Grande/Río Bravo (RG/RB), the region’s main waterway. Currently, El Paso gets about half of its annual water supply from the river by leasing or otherwise acquiring irrigation water rights in El Paso County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1.

El Paso’s switch to surface water has not been easy: barriers have included difficulties in negotiating acquisition of irrigation rights, and poor water quality in the river during times of low releases from the upstream Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs. The reservoirs are used to store about 2 million acre-feet of RG/RB waters, and their releases almost completely determine the flow of the river through the El Paso/Juárez area. These releases are tied solely to the needs of irrigators in the Elephant Butte and El Paso area and to requirements to provide annual transfers to Mexico of 60,000 acre-feet, as specified under a 1944 water treaty. The dams, while providing storage, have also greatly reduced the river’s downstream flow.

Indeed, the surface water resources of the RG/RB, have been overexploited to provide a year-round supply of water for irrigated agriculture, industry, and the border’s growing municipalities. On the U.S. side, the river is already over-appropriated; that is, allocated water rights exceed—some say they’re almost double—the amount of water routinely available.

At the same time, ongoing drought in northern Mexico and reduced flows from Mexico’s Conchos River—which feeds into the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo south of El Paso—have further impacted the river. The binational Amistad and Falcon reservoirs have fallen to some of their lowest levels since they became operable in the 1960s, severely constraining water supplies for municipalities and irrigators on both sides of the Lower and Middle Río Grande Valley.

The impacts of drought and in-stream shortfalls have been hard felt by farmers and towns on both sides of the dividing line. Some U.S. agricultural producers in the Lower Río Grande Valley estimate that their losses have approached $400 million annually in recent years. Similar figures are reported by Mexican growers, especially in the Northeast, where the past ten years have witnessed a marked decrease in the amount of land destined for agricultural production. In Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, 1995-96 estimates put crop losses at 600,000 acres of sorghum, corn, bean, and wheat crops. Tamaulipas corn production dropped 44% in the 1994-95 season, and 1995-96 was also extremely difficult. In 1996, the Mexican government was forced to import almost $2 billion worth of grain to alleviate growing hunger, with much of the grain going to northern Mexico.

The region’s cities are feeling the pinch as well. The border town of Río Bravo, in Tamaulipas, hasn’t had water service at night since the CNA reduced that municipality’s water supply by 25% last year. Some unofficial estimates put the number of Río Bravo residents with irregular access to water at 80% of the population; the other 20% manage via wells or storage tanks. Nationwide, some 38 Mexican cities are facing severe water shortages, according to CNA information. Cities on the list include Ciudad Juárez, Hermosillo, and Reynosa.

The Dwindling Río Grande

Beginning in the U.S. state of Colorado, the Rio Grande flows through New Mexico, marks the border of Texas, and ends up in the Gulf of Mexico, providing drinking water along the way for over 13 million people. It is the fifth longest river in North America and, along with its tributaries, serves as the Texas-Mexico border region’s main source of water.

From the New Mexico/Texas state line to just below El Paso, the Rio Grande has been channeled, rerouted, and otherwise managed more as an international boundary than as a river system. Flow through this stretch is almost entirely dependent upon releases from Elephant Butte and Caballo dams. From downstream of El Paso to just above the confluence with the Río Conchos, near the border town of Ojinaga, the flow of the river is severely reduced. This “forgotten river” stretch is an isolated section, with relatively small scale irrigation uses.

In normal rainfall years most RG/RB water downstream of the “forgotten river” stretch originates in Mexico as outflow from the Río Conchos. But the Conchos basin itself is heavily managed, with several large reservoirs having been constructed primarily to supply irrigation districts. Most of the municipalities in the Conchos basin supply demand with local groundwater reserves, although growth in towns like Aldama, Allende y Camargo, Chihuahua, and Delicias has lead to increased water use.

Downstream from Ojinaga, the river traverses the Coahuila/Texas borderland and enters the Amistad reservoir, administered jointly by the United States and Mexico via the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), east of Big Bend National Park. The binational Amistad and downstream Falcon reservoirs are the primary water storage and supply structures on the Texas/Mexico stretch of the Río Grande. Completed in 1968 and 1953, respectively, they supply water for irrigation and cities on both sides of the lower stretch of the river, providing a firm annual yield of about 1 million acre-feet/year.

Below the Amistad/Falcon system, water is diverted directly from the river both by a series of irrigation projects and by municipal pumping. The only major inflows in this reach are from Mexico’s Río Alamo and Río San Juan, both of which have been extensively developed for agricultural and municipal uses south of the border.

The watershed narrows considerably as the river flows toward the Gulf of Mexico. By the time it reaches the sea, the Río Grande has been reduced to a trickle, compared to pre-1962 average flows of almost 2.4 million acre-feet/year. In February 2001, the river failed to even reach the gulf, as a sand bar formed across Boca Chica Bay. Officials claimed the sand bar was the result of unusual wave action and was not caused solely by reduced river flow—but the symbolism was not lost on policymakers or the public.

Water pollution complicates water supply management, as is evident in many parts of the Río Grande basin. Pollution from dairies and irrigation return flows makes the river water above El Paso unusable for municipal purposes during low flow periods. Brackish water from irrigation return flow drains in the El Paso/Juárez area has also degraded water quality in the shallow Ro Grande alluvium aquifer. Below El Paso/Juárez, the flow in the river primarily consists of treated wastewater from El Paso, untreated wastewater from Juárez and irrigation return flows. Juárez is just now getting sewage plants—though they will provide only primary treatment at this point.

Municipal and industrial discharges (no cities in the basin have functioning secondary sewage treatment), irrigation return flows, and agricultural chemicals have also degraded water quality in the Conchos basin. A 1994 binational water quality study and a follow-up study in 1997 found high levels of arsenic (possibly from arsenic-based herbicides used on cotton) in the Lower Río Conchos, as well as other toxic pollutants. The Pecos River tributary is notoriously high in total dissolved solids and is typically unsuitable for municipal or domestic needs, though it is used for irrigation in some of the rural counties through which it passes.

Water quality in the Amistad and Falcon reservoirs remains relatively good, largely because of the size of the reservoirs. Downstream of Amistad, sewage and industrial wastewater from Nuevo Laredo and discharges from the Laredo area have caused water quality declines. In the stretch from Falcon to the mouth of the Río Grande, sewage from Mexican border municipalities, which can include industrial discharges, has also lowered water quality. High salinity is also a concern in this stretch. In this lower portion of the river, reduced river flows have also allowed saltwater infiltration from the Gulf. This change has reduced the diversity of aquatic species and several freshwater fish have disappeared, replaced by more salt-tolerant species.

Water Use in the Eastern Borderlands

Irrigation is by far the largest use of water throughout the Texas/Mexico portion of the Río Grande basin. In the El Paso/Far West Texas region, irrigation accounts for about two-thirds of water use; in the Lower Río Grande Valley of Texas, it is closer to 85%; in the Conchos basin, irrigation accounts for over 90% of water use. Municipal consumption is the next largest category on the U.S. side, ranging from 10 to 45% of use. Municipal use in the El Paso County area, for example, represents over 40% of total use, but in the Lower Río Grande Valley, it accounts for only about 14%.

Nationwide, about 83% of Mexico’s water goes to agriculture, 12% is used for human consumption in towns, and 5% is tapped by industry. As in the United States, in Mexico’s northern border zone agriculture is by far the largest consumer of river water. Municipal use in the Mexican portion of the Río Grande is reported to be about 14% of total use, ranging from less than 10% in the Conchos basin to over 35% in the Ciudad Juárez area. Other significant water uses in the basin include industrial operations, livestock watering, electricity generation, and oil and gas production. Hydropower production occurs in a few areas, most notably at Las Boquillas Dam in the Conchos basin.

A major factor impacting water use on the border is inefficiency in both municipal and irrigation systems. In urban areas, inefficiencies result from leaks in distribution systems and, in Mexican towns, a failure to meter water use. Mexico’s cities, according to a recent study by investigators at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), lose 30 to 40% of their water as a result of leaks and faulty equipment. In some cities, half the water is lost due to such problems. Ciudad Chihuahua is estimated to have a 30% loss of water from its municipal system, though losses may be higher, because only about three-quarters of the distribution system is metered.

The situation in the countryside is similar. Nationwide in Mexico, it is estimated that water loss due to seepage and evaporation in the country’s rural irrigation districts approaches 55%. Many of Mexico’s irrigation and water transfer canals—most of which are over forty years old—are not lined with concrete and are open-air.

Clearly, reducing these losses will be critical to meeting future water demands, and some efforts are already underway. For example, a recent study of irrigation in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas revealed that the Brownsville Irrigation District was able to reduce water use by 33% just by implementing surge irrigation and metering.

It’s fairly clear, however, that Mexico doesn’t have the funds necessary to upgrade its water provision infrastructure. In May 2001, shortfalls in government revenues led the Fox administration to enact budget cuts of $372 million, including a $27.5 million reduction of the CNA budget. Meanwhile, estimates of the total cost of renovating and upgrading Mexico’s wells, treatment plants, and other water infrastructure over the next ten years range as high as $60 billion.

Even with inefficiencies, however, Mexico’ per capita municipal water consumption is generally only about half the Texas per capita consumption rates. This difference is due largely to higher water use in the U.S. for lawns, landscaping, and swimming pools.

However, with respect to both irrigation and municipal use of water, price incentives for conservation have generally been lacking in both the United States and Mexico. Irrigation water is generally very low-cost, although this is starting to change. Similarly, the cost of water for municipal use has been low. Water for domestic use has been essentially free in most Mexican municipalities, which are just beginning to meter and charge for water. With the exception of El Paso, cities in the Texas portion of the basin have been slow to adopt conservation price structures (i.e., charging more per unit of water as use increases). Of course, a very real constraint on increasing the price of water for domestic use is the low-income levels of a high percentage of border residents.

Water Policy and Management in Mexico

Water resource management in Mexico is largely the province of the federal government. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution essentially provides the federal government with ownership of and jurisdiction over almost all surface water and ground water. The government issues permits for water use, pursuant to the 1992 federal water law. The permits include concessions to private interests and assignments to governmental entities, such as municipal water supply systems. These permits can be in force for anywhere from 5 to 50 years, with extensions available. No permit is required for domestic uses that do not involve construction of a water distribution system.

In theory, permit issuance is contingent on water being available. In many areas, however, the hydrological and current water use data needed to determine water availability may not exist or may be insufficient or unreliable.

The government imposes a fee for development and use of both surface and subsurface water, with certain important exceptions. In 1996, the fee varied with the location of the use and the time of year but generally ranged from about $1 per thousand cubic meters for use in aquaculture, recreation centers, or generation of hydroelectricity to $50-100 per thousand cubic meters for potable water. The government does not charge a fee for extraction and use of water for personal domestic use, for domestic use in small towns and villages, or for agricultural use in irrigation districts or unidades de riego (with the exception of agro-industrial use).

The federal government’s dominant role in water resource management is lodged in CNA, which is now part of Mexico’s environmental agency, SEMARNAT (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales). There is a division of CNA that deals with water in the northern border states. At the state level, there are Juntas Centrales de Agua y Saneamiento (central directorates of water and sewer), which are primarily responsible for each state’s role in water issues. Larger municipalities have their own water and sewer departments, and there are also Juntas Rurales de Agua Potable (rural water supply directorates).

Irrigation districts are generally established by presidential decree. In recent years, the federal government has moved to delegate responsibility for operation of the districts to user associations. The user associations hold title to the water rights and are authorized to implement a system of fees to help pay for the operation and maintenance of the water delivery structure. The ultimate objective is to have the districts be financially and operationally self-sufficient.

The 1992 water law contains a procedure for establishing Consejos de Cuenca, (basin management councils.) The dual purpose of a basin council is to improve intergovernmental coordination in water resource management and to enhance cooperation between governmental entities, water users, and other interests, including the public. A Consejo de Cuenca for the Río Bravo basin in Mexico, including the Río Conchos, was established in 1994 but has only recently begun to meet as a result of the polemic regarding Mexico’s water debt to the United States.

Binational Disputes over Water Supplies

Under a 1944 binational treaty governing the disbursement of Río Grande/Río Bravo waters, the United States has rights to either one-third of the flow reaching the river from six tributaries or a minimum of 350,000 acre-feet of water per year averaged over a five year period. Since 1992, Mexico hasn’t made full water payments under the terms of that agreement. Today, Mexico owes the United States over one million acre-feet of water from the 1992-97 period and an additional 300,000 acre-feet from the current five-year treaty cycle.

Mexico has blamed the ongoing drought in its northern region for its difficulty making the water payments. Article 4 of the 1944 treaty does in fact stipulate that Mexico can defer water payments and can transfer less than 350,000 acre-feet/year over a five-year cycle, provided there is a situation of extraordinary drought. However, the treaty does not provide further definition of the term “extraordinary drought.” This lack of certainty is now at the heart of a raging controversy, as U.S. farmers in the Lower Río Grande Valley are alleging that the drought in Chihuahua has not been so severe as to justify Mexico’s current deficit and inability to make water payments.

On March 16, 2001, the U.S. and Mexico tackled the current controversy by negotiating IBWC Minute 307. Under that agreement, Mexico promised to release an installment payment of 600,000 acre-feet of water into the RG/RB by July 31. The two countries also agreed to develop some type of drought response and “sustainable management” plan for the RG/RB basin. However, in July, Mexico failed to meet a deadline to deliver a second water payment on its deficit and in late August announced that drought conditions ruled out the possibility of a water installment by the end of September—dashing the hopes of many Texas farmers to at least salvage their late-season harvests.

The ongoing polemic was discussed by Presidents Fox and Bush when they met recently in Washington, DC, but little is known about what was said. Meanwhile, as Mexico draws fire from farmers and others in the United States for its missed payments, Fox is being criticized at home by border governors, farmers, and others for his administration’s efforts to service Mexico’s water debt to the United States. One thing is certain: despite closer U.S.-Mexico relations under the two new leaders, the issue of equitable and sustainable distribution of the border’s water resources remains a point of serious contention.

Mary Kelly is the executive director of the Texas Center for Policy Studies (TCPS). Arturo Solis directs the Centro de Estudios Fronterizos y de Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, A.C. (CEFPRODHAC). George Kourous is the director of BIOS. For more information on the TCPS and CEFPRODHAC, visit www.texascenter.org and www.giga.com/~cefprodh, respectively. This article was adapted from two reports, Water Management in the Binational Texas/Mexico Río Grande/Río Bravo Basin, by Mary Kelly (publication pending) and El Agua en La Frontera, issued by CEFPRODHAC in July 2001.

—Next month, part two of this article will look at binational water disputes on the Texas-Mexico border, the existing mechanisms and agreements governing water distribution in the region, and options for defusing the current situation.

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